This paper shows that strategies in, and reliance on the payments system as well as special liquiditysupplying tools provided by the central bank are important indicators of distress of individual banks.
large value payment system to free-up more marketable securities. Given the movements in the CDS prices and in the interbank market rates, these moves all appear to be well warranted. We argue in this paper, however, that for Canada public measures appear to have over-estimated the risk, at least relative to the price Canadian banks were willing to pay for liquidity and the amount of counterparty risk in the overnight unsecured interbank market. It appears, therefore, that the policy response was overly aggressive -or at least sustained for too long. Our main argument is that there is valuable information in high-frequency data on liquidity that has largely been ignored. This information, in addition to publicly available prices, can be extremely valuable to policy-makers. The lesson from this analysis, therefore, which is true beyond Canada, is that there can be instances when market prices hide important details and policy-makers should use all available information to measure their response.
We begin by analyzing the demand for liquidity on an individual bank level by using data from the Bank of Canada's term purchase and resale agreement auctions (PRA). These auctions provided cheap short-term liquidity to banks during the crisis in exchange for high quality collateral. Our analysis of liquidity demand focuses on heterogeneity in risk and bids in the Bank of Canada's liquidity facilities. We document that following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a short period of distress, in which Canadian banks offered a substantial spread over the reference interest rate in order to get a short-term loan from the Bank of Canada. This period of distress, however, lasted less than two months, after which the banks returned to their pre-Lehman collapse behavior. This differs markedly from the situation in Europe -Cassola, Hortaçsu and Kastl (2011) analyze the repo auctions of the European Central Bank and document a persistent change in bidding behavior by market participants. Figure 2 shows the aggregate demand curves submitted in these European auctions during 2007. Cassola et al. (2011) argue that this increased bidding aggressiveness was likely due to a persistent increase in demand for liquidity by European banks as the outside option of procuring liquidity on the interbank market deteriorated. Banks 3 There is already a broad literature studying the impact of the financial crisis on term lending in the United States. This is likely due to the problems being most obvious in this market. The Federal Reserve introduced three main facilities during the financial crisis: (i) Term Auction Facility, (ii) Term Securities Lending Facility, (iii) Primary Dealer Credit Facility. The majority of studies focus on the effectiveness of these facilities in bringing down spreads in the interbank market for term loans. The large spreads were caused by two factors: counterparty risk and liquidity demand. Taylor and Williams (2009) focus on counterparty risk and find that TAF had no effect on the interbank market. Wu (2008) separates out both risks and claims that TAF was effective in satisfying banks liquidity demand, which did reduce the stresses of the interbank market.
were thus willing to pay rates even in the primary market (the repo auctions) that were much higher than the reference overnight rate. 4 The situation in Canada was remarkably different. While the default probabilities of individual banks implied by the prices of their respective CDS contracts followed a similar pattern as their European counterparts, the Canadian banking system showed very limited signs of stress (or increase in liquidity demand) in 2007 and in the first half of 2008. In particular, the Canadian banks were much less willing to pay a premium above the reference overnight rate to obtain liquidity from the Bank of Canada. Figure 3 depicts the aggregate bidding functions in each auction that the Bank of Canada conducted before September 2008. It suggests that virtually all banks judged that even if they would not have their demands in these auctions satisfied, they could secure the liquidity elsewhere and hence were bidding at, or very close to, the reference overnight rate (OIS).
Immediately following the failure of Lehman Brothers, the demand for liquidity by both North-American and European banks went through another period of tremendous turmoil. Canadian banks, whose liquidity demands did not seem to be significantly affected during the dawn of the subprime market crisis in 2007, seemed to have suffered a period of high turbulence in the period immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. As illustrated in Figure 4 Canadian banks bid aggressively for liquidity provided by the Bank of Canada only in October and November 2008. We find the same pattern in auctions of liquidity with 1-day, 1-month and 3-months maturities. This suggests that following Lehman's collapse banks' willingness-to-pay for both a very short (an overnight) loan and for longer-term loans increased, albeit temporarily.
Using transactions level data we find that overnight market remained quite active throughout the crisis -total loans transacted stayed virtually unchanged while prices actually fell. This indicates that participants did not believe there were significant liquidity or counterparty risks. Similarly, Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) find that the overnight Feds Fund market remained active following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, although they do find evidence of increased counterparty risk. We argue that the impact of various liquidity-providing actions undertaken by the cental bank and federal government during 2008 might have led to a surplus of liquidity in the market, resulting in overnight unsecured loans transacting even below the target rate. In contrast, we find that during the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis in the summer of 2007, when these extraordinary liquidity facilities did not exist, interbank rates did increase. Similar to Acharya and Merrouche (2010) this suggests liquidity was more scarce at this time. In neither episode, however, do we find evidence of an increase in counterparty risk.
We are further able to explore the question of counterparty risk using data on intraday credit lines granted between market participants. This is the major advantage of using Canadian data relative to U.S.
or European data. Since the payment system is one where banks provide each other intraday credit lines (rather than participants receiving intraday credit from the Federal Reserve, for example in Fedwire), and therefore face manageable default risk, we can analyze changes in these credit lines to measure change in counterparty risk. We find that there are no significant changes in the credit lines during the crisis, even after the Bank of Canada introduced changes to the payment system that encouraged financial institutions to lower credit limits to riskier banks. This provides further evidence that there was no increase in counterparty risk during the financial crisis for Canadian financial institutions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1 we describe the data and present some summary statistics. In section 2 we go through the results of our analysis and section 3 concludes.
Data
In this section, we describe in detail the various data sources that we employ. We link together detailed data on banks' balance sheets, their bilateral trades with other banks and behavior in various types of liquidity facilities.
Canadian Banking Sector Background
The Canadian banking sector is highly concentrated, with 90 per cent of the industry's assets held by the six largest banks, worth a total of $2,605 billion as of March 2010. 5 The Canadian banking landscape also includes a large regional co-operative network -the Desjardins Movement in Quebec, a provincially owned deposit-taking institution -Alberta's ATB Financial, hundreds of small credit unions, about sixty-five foreign bank subsidiaries, and a small number of trust companies.
Larger Canadian financial institutions have an informational advantage over smaller institutions stemming from the tiering of the payments system and securities dealings. 6 Alfonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) suggest that the likely reason they do not find liquidity hoarding in Fedwire while Acharya and Merrouche (2010) find liquidity hoarding in the Sterling money market is tiering. Tiering in a payments network refers to an organizational structure whereby some financial institutions participate directly ("direct" clearers) while other financial institutions participate indirectly ("indirect" clearers). Chapman, Chiu, and 
Large Value Transfer System (LVTS)
Unlike the European Central Bank, the Bank of Canada does not impose any reserve requirements through which it could control interest rates and liquidity, but implements monetary policy through the Large Value
Transfer System (LVTS). During our period of study LVTS included 14 direct participants and the central bank. 7 LVTS is a payment and settlement system operated by the Canadian Payments Association through which all interbank trades have to be settled by the end of the trading day -and any potential short or long positions must be settled by the appropriate trade with the Bank of Canada at rather unfavorable interest rates. This interest rate band (the difference between the rate on overnight deposits and overnight loans) is set so that banks have the incentives to find counterparties among themselves to settle the open positions rather than to resort to the central bank. The midpoint of this band is the central bank target rate.
Like real-time gross settlement systems, which are used in almost all countries, including the United States (Fedwire) and Europe (TARGET), finality of payment sent through LVTS is in real-time. Unlike real-time gross settlement systems, however, settlement in LVTS occurs on a multilateral net basis at the end of the day. This results in substantial cost savings in terms of the amount of collateral a participant needs to put into the system. The trade-off is an increase in default risk. It is this feature that makes the 7 The direct participants include the Big 6 banks, Laurentian Bank, foreign banks with branches in Canada (State Street Bank, Bank of America, BNP Paribas, HSBC), the largest co-operative movement in Canada (Caisse Desjardins) and a provincially owned deposit-taking institution (Alberta Treasury Branches) as well as a credit union consortium (Central 1 Credit Union). Any deposit-taking institution and member of the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) can be a member of LVTS so long as they maintain an account with the Bank of Canada and have the facilities to pledge collateral for LVTS purposes. Deposit-taking institutions that are not members of LVTS must send (or receive) their payments through one of the direct participants.
Canadian system advantageous when studying counterparty risk. Financial institutions have counterparty default exposure in the payment system and they can manage it.
During the trading day, there are two ways of engaging in a transaction in LVTS with another bank.
A bank can either send a payment through a fully collateralized Tranche 1 (T1) which involves real-time settlement or through Tranche 2 (T2) in which collateral is pooled, risk is shared and settlement takes place at the end of the trading day. The two main differences between the two tranches are the costs and the risk. T1 is fully collateralized and is therefore more costly in terms of the opportunity cost of capital.
In normal times participants prefer to send payments through T2 because the collateral requirements are much smaller than in T1. The typical collateral accepted in LVTS are government of Canada securities; participants can find more productive uses for these highly liquid securities than to have them sit in the payments system. T2 operates by banks extending bilateral credit lines (BCL) to each other, which may be adjusted at any time. Providing credit lines, however, is not costless. The banks have to post collateral with the Bank of Canada which is proportional to the extended credit lines and the size of the credit lines extended towards a potentially failing bank determine a bank's exposure in case of a failure of that particular bank. Therefore T2 is a payment system where the survivor pays (whereas the defaulter pays in T1).
Our data consist of daily credit lines and T1 and T2 interbank transactions. Our data set thus provides us with a unique opportunity to study whether the banks manage their collateral efficiently -for example respectively. The credit lines between these two banks are adjusted during the day in about 2% of the cases. This description is representative of the other pairs in our data.
Counterparty Risk Implied by CDS Prices
Credit default swap contracts rose to prominence during the financial crisis with the U.S. Treasury's bailout of AIG. These types of contracts had been traded since the early 1990s, however, and publicly listed prices of CDS contract on a bank's debt, for example, could be used to measure counterparty risk.
9 Figure 5 shows the time series of the prices 10 of a 5-year credit default swap contract for 8 banks in our sample. A CDS contract is essentially an insurance contract: the buyer (who may or may not actually hold a bond issued by the bank whose CDS contract he/she purchases) is protected against default of this bank over the duration of the contract. In the event of default, the seller of the insurance contract has to pay either the face value of the bond in exchange for it or the difference between the face value and the recovery value of the bond. 
we can recover the risk-neutral default probabilities implied by the CDS prices. For the largest institutions, banks A,E and K, the implied default probabilities (assuming 40 per cent recovery rates) went from close to zero to over 15 per cent. Given the increase in default risk implied by the CDS contracts on the banks in our sample we might expect an increase in liquidity hoarding during the crisis. We explore liquidity in the next section.
Liquidity
Financial institutions manage their daily liquidity needs through market operations and their interactions with the Bank of Canada. The Bank of Canada's primary objective in providing liquidity intraday and overnight to the banking system is to reinforce the target rate (The target rate as well as the one-month and three-month overnight index swap rates are plotted in Figure 7 ). The main facility is LVTS, occasionally supplemented by open market operations such as special purchase and resale agreements and sale and repurchase agreements. These repo transactions are used to reinforce the target rate. In addition the Bank provides liquidity to LVTS participants facing shortfalls in their end-of-day settlement balances at the Bank 9 Even before the collapse of AIG some research had started to focus on the counterparty risk of the insurer in the CDS market. See for example Thompson (2010) and Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2010). 10 We combined data from Bloomberg and Markit. 11 Since 2009 CDS contracts have been standardized to require the seller of the insurance to pay the difference between the face value of the bond and its market price as determined in an auction run after the default occurs.
Rate, and in rare cases financial institutions can request Emergence Lending Assistance if they are facing serious liquidity problems. The Bank of Canada also manages the federal government's cash balances by holding twice-daily auctions. Financial institutions can access short-term loans in these auctions. When markets froze during the crisis financial institutions reliance on the central bank for liquidity grew in importance. During the crisis financial institutions accessed the aforementioned facilities and the Bank of Canada created new ones to inject more liquidity into the system.
Receiver General Auctions
The Bank of Canada is the Canadian governments fiscal agent and as such manages the Receiver General account from which the balances required for day-to-day operations are drawn. To manage its cash balances, the Bank of Canada holds twice-daily auctions through which it auctions off short-term loans, whereby it secures short-term interest income on its revenues. All auctions are held at 9:30am and at 4:30pm. Bidders are notified before 5pm the day before the morning auction about the cash balances being offered at auction in each concurrently offered tranche, where each tranche differs by maturity. The maturity is between 1 and 21 days, with 93% of offers in our sample being for loans with less than 7 day maturity. Similarly, by 4pm, bidders are notified of balances and tranches offered in the afternoon auction. All afternoon auctions are unsecured and balances are termed for one business day. The morning auctions can be both secured or unsecured and the terms can be more than one day. These auctions have been analyzed in Chapman,
McAdams and Paarsch (2007) who find that bidders' behavior is reasonably approximated by a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. In this paper we focus solely on the unsecured morning auctions. Our data set included bids (size,rate) from the morning Receiver General auctions between 01/02/2007 and 04/20/2009.
Term Purchase and Resale Agreement Auctions (PRA)
As the financial crisis unfolded it became it appeared that traditional liquidity injections were ineffective in getting liquidity from direct participants to market participants. In order to provide an additional source of liquidity to alleviate potential stresses, the Bank of Canada conducted two 1-month repo auctions in December 2007. 12 This was the first time that the Bank of Canada held cash auctions beyond one business day to support liquidity funding. 13 The PRA auctions were multiple yield competitive auctions, or in the language of auction theory, discriminatory auctions. The amounts of the initial auctions were small, $2 billion. Bidders could place up to 3 bids, with the minimum bid of $10 million with increments of $1 million. 12 The broad principle that underlined the liquidity facility was to maintain liquidity in the financial system while minimizing distortions (Selody and Wilkins (2010)).
13 Longer-term repos had been widely used by other central banks pre-crisis, most notably the Reserve Bank of Australia, but also the ECB and Bank of England. Canada, like the U.S., however, did not use long-term repos until the crisis.
Participants rated A or higher had a bidding limit of 25 per cent of the auctioned amount and those rated BBB or lower had a bidding limit of 12. Following the collapse of Lehman in September 2008, the Bank of Canada added repo auctions with 3-months maturity and held them on a weekly basis. 15 Each auction was for $2 or $4 billion, i.e. "commensurate with market conditions." That September the Bank also expanded the set of eligible collateral.
Participants could now pledge certain commercial paper and short-term municipal paper, corporate, municipal, and foreign issuer bonds with a minimum S&P rating of A-, marketable securities issued by the U.S. treasury, and bank-sponsored unaffiliated asset-backed commercial paper. 16 By accepting a wider range of assets as collateral the Bank of Canada in effect reduced the illiquidity premium of those assets.
Consistent with the G7 Action Plan in October 14th the Bank modified its liquidity facilities further so as to provide exceptional liquidity to the financial system. First, the Bank substantially increased the size 14 The majority of the primary dealers are large players. We do not know the assets of Casgrain because it is a private company, but for the other players Laurentienne is the smallest with $22.6 billion in assets in 2010; RBC is the largest Canadian bank with $655 billion in assets in 2010. 15 For monetary policy reasons the Bank of Canada also introduced 6-and 12-month loan-maturity starting in April 2009. 16 For a full list see http : //www.bankof canada.ca/en/notices f md/2008/not230908.html.
of the term auctions to as much as $12 billion. At its peak the amount of liquidity the Bank of Canada auctioned was 2% of the value of total bank assets. In the U.S. the peak was about 7% and in the Euro area the peak was 5%, again of total banking system assets. This measure intended to free-up more marketable securities to support borrowing or be used in the term PRA.
18 Table I offers some summary statistics of our sample of the bids in the term PRA auctions. The average number of bidders is 9 and the number of submitted bids averages less than 2. The average amount issued in PRAs was $4.76 billion and the yield bid (expressed as a spread over the overnight index swap (OIS)) is quite low, 0.04, with a minimum of -0.58 basis points and a maximum of 92 basis points. We use these bids to estimate banks' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for liquidity during the crisis. The reason is that since the WTP for liquidity obtained from the Bank of Canada should be equal to the opportunity cost of obtaining liquidity in the interbank market, studying the dynamics of the WTP allows us to look into the issue of counter-party risk as well. Banks that are perceived by their counterparties as riskier would be in the interbank market required to pay a premium for any loan that is not backed up by a risk-free collateral and thus would be willing to pay more. We now move on to our results.
[ Table I ]
Results
During the financial crisis central banks and financial institution regulators appeared very concerned with illiquidity and then insolvency of important financial institutions. Since the typical CDS contracts cover 5-years, their prices likely reflect mostly the likelihood of insolvency, even though there may be events 17 Foreign-bank participants could not pledge their NMLP and credit unions could only pledge the credit card portion of their portfolio. 18 Chailloux et al. (2008) discuss cross-country differences in collateral policies pre-crisis and how this affected central bank responses during the crisis. Canada, like the U.S. had a much narrow set of eligible collateral for its open market operations and standing lending facilities than the ECB. During the crisis changes to collateral requirements was one way the Bank of Canada could free of liquidity. The fact that the central bank was taking on more credit risk -bad collateral was clearly driving out good collateral (a form of Gresham's Law) -was less of a concern that getting liquidity to the market. Central banks would point out, however, that they took significant haircuts were applied to this new collateral.
triggering payout on CDS contracts that are related to illiquidity. Over periods of several months, the distinction between illiquidity and solvency becomes more-or-less semantic. Therefore, a WTP for liquidity, which persistently exceeds that of other market participants, could also be viewed as a bad signal about solvency. In this section we analyze the liquidity positions taken by Canada's main financial institutions and test how closely it relates to the financial market's perceptions of the riskiness of these institutions.
Measuring stress using banks' bids for central bank-provided liquidity
Like many central banks during the crisis an important question for the Bank of Canada was how much demand existed for term liquidity. We use data for auctions of liquidity with maturity of 1-3 days administered by the Bank of Canada on behalf of the Receiver General and of 1-or 3-month term PRA operations conducted by the Bank of Canada. To recover banks' true willingness-to-pay from the observed bids, we assume that they employ bidding strategies that are consistent with a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. This strategy is quite standard in the auction literature and in the case of discriminatory auctions has been employed previously in the context of the European short-term loan auction by Cassola et. al (2011). They show that accounting for the strategic component of bids is empirically important, since many banks increase their bids during the crisis not necessarily because of their increased willingness-to-pay (for example due to a higher need for liquidity), but rather as a best response to more aggressive behavior by some of their rivals. Using the same method as Cassola et. al (2011), we recover the true marginal willingness-to-pay from the observed bid from the equilibrium relationship:
where P c is the market clearing price, which is random from the perspective of each bidder, q k is the quantity demanded at step k and b k is the associated bid. This relationship basically says that in equilibrium of a discriminatory auction, bidders will shade their bids so as to trade-off the effect of saving due to shading against the decreased probability of winning. Turning our attention to the Receiver General auctions, perhaps surprisingly, given the very shortmaturity structure of these loans, we find the same general story. In Figure 9 we plot aggregate bids in 20 randomly chosen auctions for overnight loans from the first 8 months of 2008. It is evident that banks were not willing to pay more than the reference interest rate, and in most cases were offering yields significantly below this rate -up to 25 basis points lower, with some auctions even clearing at such a low price. Figure 10 We begin our regression analysis by studying the relationship between the spread (of the quantityweighted bid) over the index swap rate (OIS) that an individual bank is offering to pay to obtain a repoloan from the Bank of Canada in one of the liquidity auctions and key determinants of risk.
19 Table II presents summary statistics of the risk variables in the regressions.
[ Table II ] Table III summarizes the results. It is immediately visible that controlling for bank heterogeneity using bank fixed effects is important; otherwise several variables would have a counterintuitive sign. For example, the larger the share of conventional mortgages, i.e. low loan-to-value mortgages, to total assets, the lower the spread. The results depict a convincing picture that the bids are strongly related to the share of retail deposits, the share of mortgages, and to Merton's (1974) measure of distance to default. The distance to default measures the market value of a financial institutions assets relative to the book value of its liabilities. Merton's insight was that we could use the Black and Scholes (1973) framework to solve for the asset value and volatility of any firm using the value and volatility of their equity. Given asset values and volatility, as well as a risk-free rate, the distance to default is calculated as follows:
It follows that the smaller the distance to default the larger the probability the bank will default on its debt. A negative and significant coefficient on distance to default, therefore is consistent with financial 19 Given the competitive outcome of the term PRA auctions it turns out that there is very little difference between using bids and willingness-to-pay. This is very different than the ECB auctions analyzed in Cassola, Hortaçsu and Kastl (2011) where bidders perceived much more uncertainty about the market clearing price despite the large number of participants.
institutions that are further away from default bidding less for liquidity in the term PRA auctions. Unlike the correlation between distance to default and bidding we do not find a similar correlation between CDS prices and bids. This is true irrespective of whether or not we control for distance to default. This suggests that banks own valuation for liquidity via their bids is not correlated with CDS prices.
We do not find a significant relationship between banks' bids and their share of liquid assets to total assets or the amount of liquidity they obtained through 
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[ Table III] 
Balance sheet indicators
Canadian banks have to report the detailed structure of their balance sheets to the Bank of Canada, regulator (the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions), and the deposit insurer (Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation) on a monthly basis. Somewhat coarser information about balance sheets is published on the regulator's website and thus becomes subsequently public. In Figure 11 we plot the ratio of cash to total assets for all banks in our data and Figure 12 depicts the evolution of the share of liquid to total assets. Figure 13 shows the evolution of the share of residential mortgages among total assets. 20 On November 12th, 2008 the Bank of Canada announced it would provide exceptional liquidity to financial institutions under a Term Loan Facility (TLF). The TLF was a single price auction and the primary goal was to further increase flexibility in providing 1-month term liquidity since participants could use NMLP as eligible collateral. One effect of TLF would be to remove the stigma associated with the Emergency Lending Assistance program (see Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, and Shrader (2010) for the effects of stigma in the Fed's discount window and its effects on bidding in TAF by American banks during the crisis). There was very little demand, however, for TLF. 21 In addition to the variables presented in Table III we also looked at bank issuance of equity and domestic and foreign debt using the SDC database and found insignificant effects. 
Dynamics of overnight lending
Using the Furfine algorithm (Furfine (1999)) we were able to construct a series of (unsecured) overnight lending on the interbank market between January 2007 and July 2009. 22 While neither the total transacted volume nor the average size of an individual loan changed substantially during the period of our data, the interest rates varied substantially. Figures 14 and 15 plot our results. In particular, the data suggest that there was excess liquidity in the market and banks were willing to lend cash overnight for less than the target rate throughout the crisis, with the exception of the fall of 2007 during the ABCP crisis. At the same time, the variance of the rates increased substantially during the crisis. We view these two facts together as suggestive evidence that in the face of increased uncertainty banks took conservative liquidity positions and thus were willing to lend cash at rates below the target to reliable counterparties, which was not observed before the crisis. 
where F b,t is spread to target or log of loan size for bank (borrower/lender) b at time t, Date is a vector 22 The idea behind the algorithm, as we apply it, is to look at flows in the payment system and find a payment π from bank A to bank B in the late afternoon at date t and a return payment in the morning of date t + 1 of size π(1 + i) and classify these payments as loans. The price of the loan is i. The main issue with the Furfine algorithm is that it has the potential to identify some transactions as loans when they are indeed payments. This is particularly true in the case of using the algorithm early in the day or for small transactions. Unlike Fedwire, which processes Euro-dollar transactions, tri-party repo legs and bank to non-fedwire institution transactions, which may or may not be considered loans, LVTS does not process these types of transactions. Therefore using the Furfine algorithm in LVTS is less likely to lead to a misclassification of transactions. In addition we only examine transactions late in the day making misclassification even less likely.
of indicator variables, amount is the amount borrowed/lent overnight in the spread regression and α b is a borrower/lender fixed effect. The dates of interest are DF ri12, DM on15, and DT ue16, corresponding to the Friday before the Lehman collapse, the Monday of the Lehman collapse, and the Tuesday after. The key result is that aggregate trading volumes in the Feds Funds market did not change during the crisis but that the composition of the participants and the price and volumes at which they traded did change.
Acharya and Merrouche (2010) instead focus on the ABCP crisis in the summer of 2007 and its impact on the demand for liquidity in the U.K. overnight interbank market. In the above notation they are interested in measuring the impact of DAug9, i.e., the news of BNP Paribas closing two funds exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis on Thursday August 2007, on overnight lending in the U.K. interbank market.
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The key result is that there was precautionary liquidity hoarding in the summer of 2007 and this increased interbank rates, regardless of counterparty risk.
In Table IV higher than the rest of the sample, as did the amounts traded. Interestingly, the coefficients on the amount borrowed (lent) with and without fixed effects are nearly identical. This indicates that the result of the crisis was an upward shift in demand spread across the same borrowers pre-crisis and met by the same lenders pre-crisis, but at a higher rate. 25 On December 12th, 2007 the Bank of Canada implemented its first term PRA auction. At this point spreads in the overnight market fell back to their normal levels. As mentioned above, things changed again following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
[ Table IV ]
Repo market
Gorton and Metrick (forthcoming) argue that the financial crisis was centered around the repo market. As counterparty risk increased concerns about the value and liquidity of collateral suffered a run due to higher required haircuts. Similarly, Brunnermeier (2009) argues that repo lenders required more collateral, which further drained the system of liquidity. In Figure 18 we depict the end of month outstanding balances of repo transactions of the 12 largest Canadian banks. Similar to our analysis of the overnight interbank market, there seems to be little evidence of any persistent impact of the crisis on the Canadian repo market.
Part of the repo transactions shifted from trade between private banks to trade with the Bank of Canada via the purchase and resale agreement auctions, but the overall amount seems to be fairly constant over the period of our study. Of course, this figure needs to be interpreted cautiously since the structure of the outstanding collateral might have changed. 24 We pool the effects of August 9th and 10th, although this is simply for brevity since the coefficients for both days are of the same sign and significance. We do the same for August 13th and 14th. 25 In results not reported here we interact the date dummy variables with the fraction of non-performing loans to total assets. Given they find a compositional change in lenders Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) use this approach to test for hoarding. Since we do not have a change in composition of lenders this test is redundant. Nevertheless the coefficients are all insignificant, suggesting a lack of hoarding by the weaker banks.
Liquidity risk or counterparty risk?
Sofar we have analyzed the demand for liquidity by Canada's main financial institutions. Balance sheet data suggests that there was some liquidity hoarding, although results from the term PRA and Receiver General Auctions suggest that this was largely isolated to an immediate period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The dynamics of overnight lending do not suggest liquidity hoarding. Another question relates to intraday interbank counterparty risk during the financial crisis. The dynamics of overnight lending suggest very little evidence of changes in counterparty risk during the crisis. We analyze counterparty risk in more detail in this section.
Counterparty Risk Implied by the Bilateral Credit Lines in LVTS
During the financial crisis, the Bank of Canada substantially expanded the collateral deemed acceptable in the payment system. In particular, most participants were allowed to pledge their whole non-mortgage loan portfolio as collateral. This in turn meant that virtually every participant in the LVTS had an abundance of unused collateral in the system. Since as described in section 1.2, the LVTS has two tranches: a fully collateralized tranche, T1, and a partially collateralized one, T2 -it would thus seem natural that if the opportunity cost of collateral vanishes and default probabilities of counterparties increases, banks would be less reluctant to deal with their counterparties through T2 (and thus potentially bear some default risk).
In figure 16 we plot the time series of credit lines extended to bank K, which according to its CDS price experienced the most dramatic increase in the probability of default. 26 Clearly, K's counterparties in the LVTS did not fear that K might experience solvency problems since they neither refused to trade with K using T2, nor decreased the extended credit lines.
Finally, there does not seem to be any sign of banks being worried about their counterparties defaulting as the overall share of transactions processed through the fully collateralized tranche of LVTS does not appreciably increase either on the aggregate level or on the bilateral level. Figure 17 presents the fraction of transactions that pass through the fully collateralized tranche relative to the partially collateralized tranche. There was an increase in this ratio in the summer of 2007, but a fall to normal levels in the fall of 2007 and throughout 2008. This happened despite of the abundance of collateral in T1 due to the Bank of Canada's actions to allow financial institutions' non-mortgage loan books to be used in the payment system (of course, subject to a haircut).
Putting Everything Together
In the previous sections we offered smaller bits and pieces of a puzzle. We showed that CDS prices suggested a considerable increase in the default probability at least for some Canadian banks. Despite this high degree of heterogeneity in implied default probability, banks' behavior vis-à-vis each other was virtually unaffected. Even though all banks pledged excessive collateral into the payment system, they did not require the "riskier" banks to send more payments through the fully collateralized channel or reduced the credit lines extended to them. Moreover, the distribution of the willingness-to-pay for liquidity across the different banks suggests that there is no significant correlation with the CDS-implied default probability: banks with high CDS prices do not seem to have higher value for liquidity obtained from the central bank, corroborating the evidence that other banks' behavior towards these "riskier" banks did not change and hence it was probably not impossible to secure liquidity through other channels than the auctions administered by the Bank of Canada. The persistently high prices of CDS contracts may suggest that virtually all Canadian banks may face solvency issues over the life of the contract. Nevertheless, we did not find any bank having persistently high WTP for liquidity, which should be a necessary condition for insolvency. Of course, we cannot rule out that the solvency problems signalled in the CDS prices might still lie in the future. higher, suggesting the market thought that at least three of these banks were similarly risky. Therefore, it would be interesting to look at the cross-sectional variation in rates paid in the Feds Fund market as well as bidding behavior in TAF to see whether or not these institutions believed themselves to be as risky (or riskier) than the market believed using data similar to that used in Afonso et al (2010).
We also showed that the usual measures of a bank's financial health, such as the ratio of liquid assets on its balance sheets, improved throughout the crisis. One channel through which this change took place was the insured mortgages purchase program. Banks used this tool extensively to sell mortgages from their portfolio in exchange for liquidity. On the other hand, the situation stabilized very quickly and banks were not reluctant to issue new mortgage loans.
Conclusion
As in most developed countries, the Canadian banking sector came under substantial stress during the recent financial crisis. In this paper we document that, surprisingly, this stress lasted only for a few months immediately following the demise of Lehman Brothers. By the end of 2008, the behavior of Canadian banks did not exhibit any signs of anxiety and was virtually indistinguishable from their behavior prior to the crisis, which is quite in contrast to European banks. We provide suggestive evidence that this was perhaps due to a more conservative nature of portfolios that these banks held. Our results also suggest that although the Bank of Canada's response to public signals of the financial crisis may have been warranted, in light of the financial institutions' behavior in the payment system and their willingness-to-pay for liquidity it may been too strong.
We argue that looking at banks' behavior in liquidity auctions organized by the central bank might provide the Bank of Canada with a more accurate picture of the situation of the individual banks. The spread over the index swap rate each bank is offering to pay for a repo-loan is suggestive about how much it is pressed for liquidity which it might not be able to secure elsewhere. Using an equilibrium model of bidding, one can recover the willingness-to-pay from the bids, which is indicative of the opportunity cost of obtaining funding from other sources (interbank markets). We show that in our application these spreads are indeed related to various measures of bank's solvency and riskiness from the balance sheets. The bids thus may act as an aggregated snapshot of a bank's situation. Difference in Unsecured Rate and Swap Rate Figure 1 shows the daily CDOR and OIS rates. CDOR is the Canadian Dealer Offered Rate and is equivalent to LI-BOR/EURIBOR. It is the average rate for Canadian bankers' acceptances for specific terms-to-maturity, determined daily from a survey on bid-side rates provided by the principal market-makers, including the major Canadian banks. OIS is the Overnight Index Swap rate. It is an over-the-counter derivative primarily used for hedging short-term funding costs or exposures to short-term interest rate movements. OIS rates are calculated in reference to the CORRA, or Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average. In the U.S. the reference is the daily Fed Funds rate. Bank target rate 1 mth OIS at closing 3 mth OIS at closing Figure 7 shows the daily values of 1-month and 3-month OIS rates and the Target Rate of the Bank of Canada. Even though in Canada OIS rates are calculated in reference to the CORRA, or Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average, they capture expectations of the financial markets with respect to the target rate well. The government's goal was to add liquidity to the banks balance sheets so that they could continue lending.
The only mortgages that were eligible were those already insured. The government argued that since they were explicitly insuring the mortgages anyway, they were not taking on any excess risk by buying them directly. 27 The effect would be to add liquidity to the banks balance sheet in the short-term and in the The CMHC held reverse auctions on the government's behalf, held about once or twice a month. A schedule of planned auctions was published before each quarter. For each auction the minimum bid was set at a rate higher than the government's cost of borrowing, either a fixed rate for a pool of fixed-term mortgages (usually 5 years) or a fixed premium above CDOR (Canadian Dealer Offered Rate, which is the Canadian equivalent to LIBOR) in the case of a pool of floating-term mortgages (also typically 5 years).
The minimum bid rate was set at 9:40am on the day of the auction and the bids had to be received by 10:00am. Funds were allocated beginning with the highest bid until the amount of available funds were depleted, with settlement 5 days following the reverse auction. Moreover, banks were willing to accept a much lower amount than the face value and, more importantly, were competing for the supply, thus driving the discount much higher than the reserve (the minimum acceptable discount). The reserve discounts thus declines over time from 3.433% in November 2008 to 2.266% in January 2009 to 2.59% in February, 2.46% in March and 2.431% in April. While the reserve 27 See Allen, Clark, and Houde (2011) for a detailed discussion of the Canadian mortgage market. Up until the financial crisis securitization was limited in the Canadian mortgage market. For example, about 17% of mortgages were securitized in 2007. This is far less than in the United States where more than half of all mortgages were securitized. The lack of securitization in Canada likely stems from the fact that mortgages are short-term (typically 5 years), and therefore Canadian banks do not have as much incentive as U.S. banks to sell off the interest rate risk associated with selling a mortgage. During the crisis, however, the level of mortgage securitization in Canada increased substantially -to 30% in 2009. discount did not change too much, banks' interest in selling mortgages from their portfolio at that discount disappeared relatively quickly. 
